The 20 Minute Reading Group: Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil, Preface (Part 2)

Introduction

Again, the goal is to just read a little philosophy well. Here's the previous text & discussion.

To sum up last time: If Truth is a woman, then philosophers have not been terribly good at seducing her. However, even though their love results in failed dogma, at least they love. Nietzsche identified "scoffers" who may not even be able to do that.

Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil, Preface (the next few lines, from this etext)

But to speak seriously, there are good grounds for hoping that all dogmatizing in philosophy, whatever solemn, whatever conclusive and decided airs it has assumed, may have been only a noble puerilism and tyronism; and probably the time is at hand when it will be once and again understood WHAT has actually sufficed for the basis of such imposing and absolute philosophical edifices as the dogmatists have hitherto reared: perhaps some popular superstition of immemorial time (such as the soul-superstition, which, in the form of subject- and ego-superstition, has not yet ceased doing mischief): perhaps some play upon words, a deception on the part of grammar, or an audacious generalization of very restricted, very personal, very human--all-too-human facts.

Comment / Prompt

Nietzsche says there are "good grounds" for hoping that philosophy's creation of dogma, no matter how solemn it may seem, is nothing but a noble childishness, a product of being brand new at philosophy. This is most peculiar: Why doesn't he just say the philosophers of the past were childish? He leaves it open that they might have hit on truth, they might be on to something. He also leaves it open that dogmatizing might have to happen, no matter what.

He continues: "probably the time is at hand" that people will realize that huge philosophical problems, or even the deepest things people believe ("imposing and absolute philosophical edifices" can be a lot) are nothing but plays on words, grammatical deceptions, large generalizations.

This is an enormous claim, and he only gives us a taste of what he means. To take an example I think fitting: Dogmatic philosophers have built so much on the idea that mankind is rational, mankind can know. Descartes' famous "cogito ergo sum" - I think therefore I am - comes immediately to mind. Placed in its proper context, it is a call to question everything the schoolmen of the Church taught and do science. "I think therefore I am" is probably what is meant by the "subject" and "ego" superstition: because a "subject" thinks, it is transformed into an "I" (ego). I'm sure there are scholars with much more refined thoughts about this point, but I'll stick to my guns, because it isn't hard to see the cogito as all three things Nietzsche complains about: a play upon words ("I am" is used in a declarative, emphatic sense, as opposed to a claim about existence or possessing certain properties), a grammatical deception (it's easy to identify people who are who literally cannot think but most certainly are), and "an audacious generalization of... very human - all-too-human facts" (thinking seems to mean a very particular thing for Descartes).

The funny thing about the cogito, then, is that it is a more modern version of claiming people have souls. "There's some invisible spirit that makes you rational and truly you." I should be clear: there's a lot to be said in defense of the cogito, a lot to be said in defense of the earlier notion of soul. There's a lot about ourselves we can't explain and depend on for our identity. It remains to be seen what Nietzsche thinks we can achieve beyond these "superstitions," which thoughtful people have found meaning and insight through.